The ISCIP Analyst, Volume VII, Issue 2 by Comstock, Michael et al.
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy The ISCIP Analyst
2002-01-30
The ISCIP Analyst, Volume VII, Issue
2
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/11992
Boston University
 1 
THE ISCIP ANALYST 
Volume 7, Number 2 (January 30, 2002) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Michael Comstock 
 
A quiet two weeks 
Putin has been out of country for much of the last two weeks, visiting Poland; his 
absence could explain the relative quiet on the political arena. Of immediate 
concern, Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov has nearly concluded the 
investigation of Vyacheslav Aminov and it will be interesting to see if Aminov's 
boss, Aleksandr Voloshin, can survive politically. (INTERFAX, 0629 GMT, 11 Jan 
02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0111, via World News Connection) The liquidation of 
broadcasting company TV-6 also is proceeding apace. On 21 January, press 
ministry bailiffs served notice revoking the current broadcasting license of TV-6, 
prohibiting it from assuming the form of another corporate entity. This means that 
a new broadcasting license must be obtained should the TV-6 team want to 
regroup as a new television or cable corporation. (INTERFAX, 1511 GMT, 21 Jan 
02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0121, via World News Connection) TV-6 has been 
denounced by official Moscow as a mouthpiece of exiled politician Boris 
Berezovsky, who is one of the banner carriers of opposition to Putin. Although 
officials have denied that the actions taken to liquidate TV-6 were politically 
motivated, one cannot help but find a very peculiar correlation of interests, power 
and opportunity in this case. (INTERFAX, 0617 GMT, 22 Jan 02; FBIS-SOV-
2002-0121, via World News Connection) Ironically, while the last TV station 
beyond the Kremlin's grasp was going under, Putin was awarded the MUJ's 
(Moscow Union of Journalists) Prize for "Openness to the Press" with specific 
reference to informing the average Russian of state reforms. (ITAR-TASS, 0039 
GMT, 19 Jan 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0118, via World News Connection) 
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Putin seems to be focusing his energy on foreign policy initiatives, citing the need 
for an alliance of Eurasian gas producers while in Turkmenistan, and supporting 
Brazilian accession to a permanent seat on the UN Security Council in exchange 
for military sales and support for Russia's own bid to join the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). (INTERFAX, 0957 GMT, 21 Jan 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0121, 
and ITAR-TASS, 2006 GMT, 14 Jan 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0114, via World News 
Connection) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Has the FSB finally gone too far? 
Last month's conviction of journalist Grigory Pasko was only one of three high-
profile Russian "spy trials" in recent months. Both Valentin Moiseev and Igor 
Sutgayin also have been convicted, with dubious evidence, on counts of treason 
and espionage. But Pasko's case especially has resulted in a spate of extremely 
public fora and debates by human rights activists, calling for FSB activities to be 
curtailed. 
 
Because of direct support from President Vladimir Putin, the FSB for the last few 
years has been able to act with impunity in implementing its peculiar view of 
defending Russia's security. Now, however, it seems that the FSB finally may 
have overstepped its bounds. 
 
On 16 January, a group of activists, including Lyudmilla Mikhailovna Alexeeva, 
chair of the Moscow Helsinki Group, and Alexei Simonov, president of The 
Defense of Glasnost Association, held a press conference at the Press 
Development Institute in Moscow. Their main goals were to publicize the tactics 
that the FSB uses in the pursuit of its aims, and to set out a list of proposals that 
would constrain the security services' power. 
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According to the information given at the meeting, the main reason that the FSB 
is able to act unhindered is that it remains outside Russia's judicial system. When 
Russia joined the Council of Europe in May 1998, the penitentiary system was to 
have been transferred wholesale to the justice ministry -- a condition for entry 
into the council. (FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, 16 Jan 02; via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) Membership was contingent on Russia's promise to fulfill this 
obligation. However, this transfer has not occurred and, lacking oversight, the 
FSB has been able to violate all the norms of a criminal justice system. 
 
Holding its prisoners at the infamous Lefortovo Prison, formerly the headquarters 
of the KGB's 2nd Chief Directorate, the FSB determines legal visitation rights -- 
or the lack thereof -- for suspects. Furthermore, the agency pursues a policy of 
keeping defendants in custody for an indefinite period, so that, like Pasko, they 
have already served several months, if not years, in prison by the time their 
cases reach trial. This is in direct contravention to Article 5, Section 3 of the 
Criminal Code, which makes it illegal to hold a suspect in indefinite pre-trial 
detention. (FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, 16 Jan 02; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
The criticism of the FSB by human rights groups is not new, and has become 
commonplace since Putin gained the presidency. What is new and important, at 
this point in time, is that even members of Russia's heretofore-submissive media 
have begun to criticize the FSB's power. Russian newspapers carried several 
articles in the last week. 
 
Semen Novoprudsky, a columnist for Izvestiya, says that the FSB is behaving as 
it is because "Professional security officers want revenge for 'oblivion' under a 
previous President." (BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, 18 Jan 02; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) Nor is revenge the only motivation. Novoprudsky 
alleges that the security services moved to close down TV-6 because of its links 
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to Boris Berezovsky, who owns 76% of the company, and is a "personal enemy 
of the special services and of Putin." Apparently, the FSB is trying to lure the 
oligarch back to Russia in order to arrest him. (BBC WORLDWIDE 
MONITORING, 18 Jan 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Ultimately: "The 
main objective of Putin's rule is simple control over his own people: when the 
service personnel of the punitive system begin steering the country, no-one cares 
about reform any longer." 
 
Such a conclusion is hardly surprising. One hopes that President Putin may rein 
in the FSB a little. Unlikely though that is, the reassertion at least by a few 
journalists of the traditional role of the press is encouraging, as is the publication 
of complaints that the security services have gone too far. What remains to be 
seen is how the security services will react to such open criticism. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
MEDIA 
Time of death 00:00:00 
The pulse of free television in Russia flat-lined at midnight on 22 January 2002, 
when, by the order of Media Minister Mikhail Lesin, TV-6 broadcasts were 
interrupted. For several hours the screen was blank. Then, the frequency was 
given to NTV Plus, which plans to broadcast the Olympic Games in Salt Lake 
City in February. On 27 March, the license will be awarded to the winner of a 
tender. (INTERFAX, 1015 GMT, 22 Jan 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0121, via World 
News Connection) 
 
There is, of course, a story to this moral 
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The moral involves the oligarch behind TV-6, Boris Berezovsky. On 23 January, 
Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Nikolai Patrushev told journalists that the 
agency "has proof of Berezovsky's connections with Chechen fighters." This 
refers, above all, to the alleged financing of illegal armed formations and their 
leaders. Berezovsky is currently on the federal wanted list, but, according to 
Patrushev, the FSB will submit this information to its foreign partners in Interpol 
and demand his extradition. (NTVRU, 24 Jan 02; via www.ntvru.com) 
 
Berezovsky reacted calmly to the accusations of "dealing with the rebels," noting 
that he cooperated with what, at the time, were legally elected Chechen officials, 
including Maskhadov, Basaev, Ugudov, Raduev and Zakaev; was involved in the 
Russian-Chechen peace process in 1997; and negotiated the release of a 
kidnapped OMON police officer from Penza. He also dismissed the threat of an 
extradition demand, saying that the general prosecutor's office has been making 
such threats for a year, but has yet to submit a single piece of paper to Interpol. 
As for the $2 million Berezovsky gave to Basaev for the rebuilding of a cement 
factory in Chire-Yurt (Basaev split the money with Maskhadov and the factory 
was never built), and the money paid for kidnapped soldiers and journalists, he 
said these transactions had been covered previously in the media, and the 
current grandstanding was entirely political in nature. 
 
Berezovsky suggested that the sudden seizure of the television channel was 
based on an outdated law used by LUKoil, and due to the planned broadcast by 
TV-6 of a new film would present the story behind the apartment house blasts in 
Moscow and Volgodonsk, which Berezovsky (and not only he) alleges were 
carried out by the FSB. He has been promising that he will provide irrefutable 
evidence of FSB involvement, and asserts that the shutdown of TV-6 was related 
directly to the government's desire to get even with him for this accusation. 
(NTVRU, 25 Jan 02; via www.ntvru.com) 
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A week earlier, after a number of top government officials, including Media 
Minister Mikhail Lesin, expressed support for the staff of TV-6, the crew thought 
that it understood the hint, and cut ties with Berezovsky. On 15 January, 50 
leading journalists, headed by anchor Yevgeny Kiselev, established OOO (limited 
liability company) "TV-6." (NTVRU, 15 Jan 02; via www.ntvru.com) Unfortunately, 
this didn't help. At the last moment, realizing that the media ministry, which had 
already attained its revenge on Berezovsky, was not going to go through with the 
implied side of its bargain and let TV-6 survive, Kiselev tried to back out of the 
deal. He asked Lesin to recall the document in which TV-6 waived its 
broadcasting license in exchange for a temporary one, but the plea came too 
late. (INTERFAX, 1328 Jan 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0121, via World News 
Connection) 
 
The anchors of TV-6's main programs have been invited to air their programs on 
independent radio station Ekho Moskvy until they can win back control of their 
channel, but it is unclear whether the journalists will be able to shake the 
connection to Boris Berezovsky, which compromises them in the eyes of many 
citizens as well as of the government. 
 
Now, following the logic of "where Kiselev goes, trouble follows," Ekho Moskvy is 
next on the march route of the camouflaged, masked, Kalashnikov-wielding 
security officers. In addition President Putin's spokesman for Chechnya, Sergei 
Yastrzhembsky, announced that the Russian government will "closely monitor" 
Radio Liberty's planned Chechen-language broadcasts "and if we see that [they 
contain] calls for inciting religious, national, ethnic, strife or propaganda of 
terrorism [the government] will act in line with the law." Radio Liberty would 
receive a slap on the wrists for the first violation, but a second one could result in 
"the annulment of its broadcasting license in Russia and the closure of its 
bureau." (ASSOCIATED PRESS, 28 Jan 01; via Johnson's Russia List) 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
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Berezovsky's party stronger than his media 
Boris Berezovsky recently has enjoyed more luck in the political sector than he 
has with the media. His Liberal Russia party was strengthened significantly when 
four State Duma deputies (Viktor Pokhmelkin, Sergey Yushenkov, Vladimir 
Golovlev and Yuli Rubakov) jumped ship from the Union of Right Forces (SPS). 
 
Berezovsky ultimately is looking to join forces with Grigory Yavlinsky's 
YABLOKO, a move that will bring much-needed funding to the party. All 
members of the Liberal Russia party will be admitted to YABLOKO, while 
Pokhmelkin will become a deputy chairman. If YABLOKO gains the necessary 
five percent of the vote in the next parliamentary elections, Berezovsky will have 
a new platform for political opposition to President Putin. (GAZETA.RU, 24 Jan 
02; www.gazeta.ru, via Johnson's Russia List) 
  
The Communists also are thinking about the parliamentary elections. The newly 
re-elected chairman, Gennady Zyuganov, suggests that elections might be held 
early, because of dropping oil prices and growing wage arrears. Zyuganov 
asserts that "the Communist Party has strengthened its positions over the past 
three years and has gained 55,000 new members," while the industrial growth in 
the "communist-dominated regions was two-three times faster than in Russia as 
a whole." (INTERFAX, 0727 GMT, 24 Jan 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0124, via World 
News Connection) 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Duma deputies face full plate, emptying glasses 
Elections or not, the deputies will have much on their plate in the coming season. 
At a meeting on 23 January, the president and the prime minister discussed what 
bills should take priority in the Duma. These will include a draft banking reform, 
as well as bills concerning tax and pension reforms, the railways, electric power 
industry and the improvement of bankruptcy and business rehabilitation 
procedures. (ITAR-TASS, 1240 GMT, 23 Jan 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0123, via 
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World News Connection) State Duma Deputy (Independent) Vladimir Ryzhkov 
also named some top-billing legislation, including the Labor Code, a new 
Customs Code which would correspond to WTO standards, bills concerning 
agricultural-use land sales, and additional details of the judicial "reform." (See the 
article on the Security Services in the current NIS Observed.) (ITAR-TASS, 1403 
GMT, 21 Jan 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0123, via World News Connection) 
 
There is also a rather unorthodox bill that has been introduced by the Federation 
Council. Titled "On State Regulation of the Production and Distribution of Ethyl 
Alcohol, Spirits, and Alcohol-Containing Products," the proposal seeks to restrict 
the sale of alcohol to certain ethnic groups in Russia's northern regions, where 
"alcoholism among the indigenous people... has reached a critical point and 
poses a threat to entire ethnic groups." The parliamentarians cited similar laws in 
the northern regions of Canada. After reviewing studies of the Siberian Branch of 
the Academy of Medical Sciences, which show that the death rate from 
alcoholism is 16 to 20 times higher among small ethnic groups than among other 
persons living in the same region, Federation Council members asserted that 
"alcohol is at the root of many evils in other Russian regions and it is necessary 
to consider some restrictive measures throughout Russia." (ITAR-TASS, 1048 
GMT, 16 Jan 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0116, via World News Connection) 
 
REGIONS 
One district's solution 
In fact, officials in one region have taken the matter into their own hands. The 
Ponazyrevsky district of the Kostroma Oblast' works on a system in which 
salaries are not given out in rubles, but rather as cardboard "money-cards" which 
cannot be used to purchase alcohol. The arrangement, which has replaced 
regular currency, has been criticized by the Kostroma regional administration, 
since the use of currency other than the national currency is technically illegal, 
but local officials and villagers are happy about never needing to carry money, 
confident in the triple-signature-plus-stamp security of the low-tech version of a 
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debit card, and pleased about the fact that alcoholism has diminished among the 
residents. (RUSSIA JOURNAL, 25 Jan 02; via Johnson's Russia List.) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Scott Bethel 
 
Is Russia concerned about proliferation? 
Despite assurances by foreign ministry spokesman Aleksandr Yakovenko that 
"Russia is seriously concerned about proliferation of weapons, including nuclear 
ones," (ITAR-TASS, 1533 GMT, 2 Jan 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) it is unclear whether Moscow's desire to operate a cash-and-
carry arms trade is greater than its desire to limit the spread of certain types of 
weapons. 
 
For years, Russia has been a major exporter of sophisticated weaponry to 
developing nations. Moscow has long-standing major arms deals with India and 
China for top-of-the-line hardware and has just concluded a huge co-production 
deal for the Ilyushin IL-214. This creates the fourth such enterprise between 
Moscow and Delhi. (ITAR-TASS, 1026 GMT, 21 Jan 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) Russia also has increased its efforts to export arms 
to Central and South America, particularly over the last year, aggressively 
seeking increased opportunities in South America (and suffering a major setback 
there when Argentina collapsed). 
 
Nor has Russia missed an opportunity to exploit the zeal of certain developing 
countries for nuclear capability. Moscow assisted several Central and South 
American states, including Brazil, in acquiring and building nuclear power plants. 
(NUCLEAR POWER, 21 Mar 01; via www.eia.doe.gov) Russia also seems willing 
to assist countries that seek to develop indigenous nuclear capabilities that could 
be used for energy or weapons. To this end, Russia is close to completing a deal 
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with Burma (Myanmar) to build a test reactor. (ITAR-TASS, 1357 GMT, 22 Jan 
02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) This is especially 
significant since Burma is virtually surrounded by neighbors already in the 
"nuclear club," specifically China, India and Pakistan. Finally, Russia has worked 
out a deal to continue its long-standing relationship with Iraq for dual-use 
military/civilian nuclear technologies. (INTERFAX, 1503 GMT, 17 Jan 02; FBIS-
SOV-2002-0117, via World News Connection) 
 
All this has occurred against the backdrop of renewed Russian efforts to 
negotiate with the US about mutual reduction of nuclear arsenals. Recent talks 
between Col.-Gen. Yuri Baluevesky and members of the US Joint Staff focused 
on hammering out a proposal for accelerated reduction in nuclear arms. 
(INTERFAX, 22 Jan 02; via lexis-nexis) The Russians clearly desire to reduce 
their own aging arsenal, impelled by financial considerations (maintenance costs) 
and by the challenge of keeping such a large quantity of weapons secure. But 
that is all the more reason for Russia to continue to be a leading exporter of 
weapons and technology. 
 
In the foreign policy arena, Moscow issues all the correct words concerning 
proliferation of both military hardware, and, perhaps more importantly, nuclear 
technology. Further, Russia has expressed concern that the US withdrawal from 
the ABM treaty somehow would increase the chances of further nuclear 
proliferation. However, it is clear that Russia uses the arms trade as a primary 
foreign policy tool. Moscow does not scrutinize the human rights records of the 
consumers or ask many questions as to the proposed uses of the weapons it 
sells. 
 
Indeed, on occasion Moscow's exporting efforts fly in the face of its "participation 
in the war on terrorism." Certainly, a region's stability should be considered in 
estimating the bottom line profits of exporting technology. While Russia has 
announced its intent to support efforts to develop the nuclear research facility in 
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Myanmar, two Pakistani nuclear scientists purportedly connected to Osama bin 
Laden apparently have found refuge there. Moreover, imported terrorist 
sympathizers are not the only cause of concern in the area: In addition to 
concerns by the domestic opposition, Myanmar's neighbors, including Thailand, 
are worried about the military government controlling nuclear facilities. 
(DEMOCRATIC VOICE OF BURMA, 1430 GMT, 12 Jan 02; FBIS-EAS-2002-
0114, via World News Connection) 
 
Russia is likely to continue on this course and even to make increased efforts to 
expand its market share at the expense of the US. Russia can offer a developing 
country significant military technology without constraints on its use, unlike the 
US. Countries such as Iran and Iraq, among others, have taken full advantage of 
this aspect of Russian foreign policy and Moscow shows no sign of change. 
 
Russia continues to side with Iraq 
Feeling the pressure building for a possible expansion to its territory of the war 
against terrorism, Iraq hastily dispatched Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz to 
Moscow in an effort to rally support against potential US action. Aziz met 
extensively with foreign ministry officials, including Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. 
 
Aziz is most concerned with the apparent efforts by the United States to establish 
a link between the 11 September bombings and Baghdad. (THE NEW YORK 
TIMES, 12 Dec 01; via nytimes.com). He has appealed regularly to world leaders 
in an effort to garner support among countries within the counter-terrorism 
alliance. His goal is to weaken the resolve among alliance members to stay the 
course if Iraq is shown to be a supporter of Al Qaeda. 
 
It appears that Aziz found a willing ear in Moscow. The foreign ministry's 
ambassador-at-large, Nikolay Kartuzov, said, "There is no evidence of Baghdad's 
complicity in the events of 11 September, nor is there proof that Iraq supports 
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terrorists." (ITAR-TASS, 1315 GMT, 22 Jan 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Aziz appears to have been able to keep Russia on Iraq's side. While Iraq has 
been a long-standing customer of Russian military hardware, currently there is 
something of a cash-flow problem between Moscow and Baghdad. Since the US-
sponsored sanctions have been in place limiting Iraq's ability to sell its oil freely 
on the open market, Baghdad has withheld most of the money it owes the 
Russians, pending the lifting of sanctions. So, it is as much an economic as a 
political decision for the Russians to support Iraq. 
 
Russia still wants to be part of the club 
Russia still desires to be part of European-dominated international organizations 
such as the European Union (EU). During recent talks with European leaders, 
Russian President Vladimir Putin and his foreign policy team stressed the 
importance of increased cooperation. In meetings with the French president, 
Putin pointedly identified his goals: "I would like to emphasize that Russia is 
interested in the creation, as soon as possible, of a single security space in 
Europe and common economic, cultural, educational, and legal spheres." 
(RUSSIAN PUBLIC TV-ORT, 2030 GMT, 15 Jan 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Putin also continues to push for Russian membership in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). During the week of 21 January, the WTO met in Geneva to 
continue deliberations on whether to bring Russia into the fold. The organization 
has established a working group to examine specifically Russia's putative 
involvement. (ITAR-TASS, 1500 GMT, 21 Jan 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0121, via 
World News Connection) Russia already has close ties with the WTO by means 
of significant representation on important working groups, including those dealing 
with agriculture and roadworks; however, currently it does not enjoy full member 
status.  
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The main obstacle to Russia's viability in the WTO or the EU is that Moscow has 
not come far enough politically, economically or socially to be on a par with the 
other members. There are grave concerns in Europe over the recent crackdown 
on free speech. Foremost on the minds of Europeans are the recent "treason" 
trials of prominent Russian journalists and the forced closure of TV-6, the 
remaining major independent station. Also, Russia has not instituted sufficient 
market reforms to demonstrate to Europe that it is ready to compete with free 
market economies. 
 
Putin is hoping to parlay his foreign policy asset as a supposed major factor in 
the "global war against terrorism" into increased status in the world markets. 
However, without some degree of confidence that extending Moscow an 
invitation to join the world's economic elite will mean increased profits and 
potential markets for Europe, it is likely that the notion of bringing Russia into the 
EU or WTO will remain a discussion point only. If Putin were to demonstrate that 
Russia is serious about reform and is prepared to loosen the "services'" grip on 
the media, on the other hand, Moscow probably would be on the fast track to 
being part of "the club." 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces and Military-
Industrial Complex 
By Walter Jackson 
 
The 2002 defense budget figures are in 
There really are no surprises with the details of the Russian Federation's 2002 
defense budget. The debate was very vocal and very public. But many critics 
argue that the budget still falls short of meeting the military's needs. There are 
three main defense issues: modernization of hardware, quality of service and 
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combat readiness. In the West, support for one or two of these issues usually is 
underfunded to allow for speedy improvements of the other. How does Russia's 
2002 defense budget stack up? Acquisition of new hardware is being delayed for 
years when "projections" indicate that the Russian economy will be better able to 
afford the substantial cost of replacing aging aircraft, ships and tanks. At a recent 
meeting with Russian ground force generals, Russian Deputy Defense Minister 
Col.-Gen. Nikolay Kormiltsev stated that "For the most part, funds will be 
channeled not into buying new models of weaponry and military hardware but 
into upgrading those that already exist." (ITAR-TASS, 1631 GMT, 16 Jan 02; 
FBIS-SOV-2002-0116, via World News Connection) So the interim fix is to 
modernize existing aircraft, ships and tanks with new computerized navigation, 
radio and weapon systems -- a much more affordable alternative. But the interim 
fix for pay and allowances appears less promising. 
 
Smoke and mirrors 
The first major changes to the military payroll system are to begin this year. 
According to Russian Deputy Defense Minister Lyubov Kudelina, "military pay 
scales in 2002 will be equalized with salaries of state officials, or at least 
doubled." However, the actual average increase in officers' salaries reportedly 
will amount to only 35%. This substantial raise does not begin to cover the actual 
rate of inflation for 2001, or the cost of replacing the housing and utility subsidies 
that are scheduled to end this summer. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 21 Jan 02; 
What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security Database) The projected rate 
of inflation (best case) is estimated to be 18% for 2002. The end result is a net 
loss for military personnel and the quality of life for their families by any 
accounting standard. So where is Russia spending the majority of its defense 
rubles? 
 
And the winner is combat readiness 
According to Kudelina, "most of the Defense budget will be spent on combat 
readiness and development of the armed forces." (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 21 
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Jan 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security Database) Thus 
combat readiness wins the lion's share of the defense budget, deemed the 
highest priority for today's Russian military. Not a bad choice if Russia perceives 
its immediate security challenge as the capability to engage, fight and win a war 
today. Clearly, to date the ground forces have performed poorly in Chechnya, 
and the naval forces still are recovering from the Kursk accident (a clear 
readiness issue) and subsequent Northern Fleet investigations. (See THE NIS 
OBSERVED, 12 Dec 01) How much harder is military personnel willing to work to 
improve readiness, when living conditions (their number one complaint) remain 
poor? Brand new aircraft are great, but upgrading the time-tested "old ones" is 
palatable to most military professionals, for the short term. 
 
There is no right or wrong answer to this delicate balancing act within the 
defense budget. The question revolves around priorities. One argument is that 
there is no immediate threat to Russian national security. Thus improving quality-
of-life issues first might improve retention and morale-building in Russia's 
professional military. Second priority should be readiness, building an affordable 
short-term modernization program, and third priority is the acquisition of new 
hardware systems. As long as pay and housing issues aren't on the front burner, 
the military will not compete successfully with other employment opportunities 
and the status quo likely will be as good as it gets. 
 
One good solution to troop morale 
A recent Russian presidential decree supports military deferments for Russian 
Orthodox priests. According to Russian Orthodox Church spokesmen Viktor 
Malukhin, "it's obvious that it is impossible to reproduce in 10 years something 
that has been destroyed for 70 years." Having a chaplain in an armed forces unit 
"would bring moral relief to soldiers who serve under hard conditions, [and] help 
eradicate hazing [bullying], and would give active assistance to commanders." 
Regimental priests served in the military until the Russian revolution. 
(INTERFAX, 1506 GMT, 15 Jan 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0115, via World News 
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Connection) Military chaplains have remained an integral part of Western 
militaries. US chaplains perform a vital role comforting personnel of all faiths. 
Indeed, most Western commanders will report that chaplains are priceless 
resources who play a critical role in maintaining a high state of combat readiness. 
Returning priests to military service would provide the "high moral fiber" needed 
to help commanders successfully combat hazing and other current inappropriate 
behaviors plaguing the Russian military. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Election roundup ready, set, go! 
1. Viktor vs. Petro 
As Ukraine approaches the official start of the parliamentary election campaign 
on 9 February, there is little doubt as to which groups will be competing for the 
largest representation in the body. According to four recent polls, Petro 
Symonenko's Communist Party and Viktor Yushchenko's Our Ukraine bloc will 
head into the official campaign almost neck and neck, allowing for the statistical 
margin of error factor. 
 
One of the polls, from the well-respected Social Monitoring Center, finds the 
Communists and Our Ukraine separated by only two-tenths of one percent. 
According to their survey, the Communist Party garners the support of 14.6 
percent of the electorate, while Our Ukraine is supported by 14.4 percent. The 
third place bloc -- the pro-presidential, hastily created and vaguely defined 
Women for the Future -- follows with 7.3 percentage points. (UKRAINIAN NEWS, 
23 Jan 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
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Another poll done by the SOCIS Social and Marketing Research Center came up 
with similar numbers. The survey, commissioned by Politychna Dumka 
magazine, suggested that Our Ukraine is leading all parties and blocs with 18.8 
percent of voter support compared to the Communist Party's 16 percent. 
(HOLOS UKRAYINY, 22 Jan 02; BBC Monitoring, via lexis-nexis) 
 
Meanwhile, two of Ukraine's other large research firms, the Democratic Initiatives 
Foundation and GfK-USM, found an even greater gap between the two. 
According to Novyy Kanal TV in Kyiv, Democratic Initiatives announced that 21 
percent of its respondents supported Our Ukraine, while 15 percent supported 
the Communists. Given the small 1,200-person sample of the national survey, 
the statistical margin of error (not given in the report) easily might close this six-
point differential. (NOVYY KANAL, 1100 GMT, 24 Jan 02; via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) The GfK-USM research firm released almost identical 
numbers, but with a larger sample. In a survey of 5,000 potential voters, the firm 
found that 22 percent of respondents supported Our Ukraine, versus 15 percent 
for the Communists. (KIEV POST, 24 Jan 02; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
Despite the fact that another group is challenging the Communists for a nominal 
plurality in the parliament, it is doubtful that Mr. Symonenko feels concerned. The 
coalition created by Yushchenko is fragile, aimed largely at the upcoming 
election. This, combined with the habit of Ukrainian legislators to shift allegiances 
often, brings into question Yushchenko's ability to keep the group united after the 
31 March election. Therefore, while many commentators are hailing 
Yushchenko's success, the hard work will come in April. 
 
Much of that work will center on finding a balanced working relationship with the 
For a United Ukraine bloc. This new bloc of power, which includes Prime Minister 
Anatoliy Kinakch and is led by Presidential Chief of Staff Volodymyr Lytvyn, 
managed between 5-6 percent in each of the recent polls. Even though its 
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support is low, For a United Ukraine's political connections could easily make it 
the most powerful group in the upcoming parliament. 
 
2. Yulia Tymoshenko, Round 10 
One of the biggest surprises in the polls has been the support given to the 
Women of the Future bloc. In the three largest polls, the party receives between 
5 and 7.3 percent of respondent support -- outpacing For a United Ukraine. 
Numbers can be deceiving, however. The group, which refuses to say from 
whom and from where it receives its funding, is thought to be closely aligned with 
President Leonid Kuchma, and by extension, with most members of For a United 
Ukraine. 
 
So, why form a separate bloc? The answer may lie in Kuchma's desire to 
undermine support for Yulia Tymoshenko -- the country's most famous (or 
perhaps most notorious) female opposition leader. The new group, which its 
founders claim was created over one year ago, could be producing confusion 
among those who support Tymoshenko. As Women for the Future has seen a 
meteoric rise in its poll numbers over the last two months, Tymoshenko's bloc 
has remained in the bottom half of the list -- in danger of missing the four-percent 
target. 
 
That may change soon. In recent months, because of criminal cases brought 
against her by the prosecutor-general, Tymoshenko had struggled against 
restrictions on media appearances and a travel ban keeping her in Kyiv. But 
those cases now have been dismissed. Just last week, Tymoshenko's request to 
have her travel restrictions lifted was granted by a Kyiv court. (ONE PLUS ONE 
TV, 1608 GMT, 25 Jan 02; BBC Monitoring, via lexis-nexis) She has begun 
traveling and campaigning aggressively to publicize her bloc -- the Yulia 
Tymoshenko Coalition. Whether she can resurrect herself and her supporters yet 
again remains to be seen, but there are indications she may be on her way to 
doing just that. [On 29 January, shortly before this analysis went to press, 
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Tymoshenko was injured in a motor vehicle accident, for which authorities are 
blaming her driver. She is reported to be in serious but stable condition, with 
head and chest injuries. Opposition leaders, no doubt, will demand an inquiry.] 
 
3. What's in a name? 
What's a party to do if it asks to become a member of Our Ukraine but is rejected 
by Viktor Yushchenko? Easy: Just get another Yushchenko. 
 
On 25 January, the Yedyna Rodyna party did just that, when it announced that it 
had formed the For Yushchenko! bloc. Since Viktor Yushchenko had no interest 
in joining the cause, the party unveiled its own version -- a 52-year-old pensioner 
with absolutely no political experience named Volodymyr. But, not to worry, 
Volodymyr Yushchenko says, "I do not consider myself a pawn," and claims to 
respect the other Yushchenko "very much." (UKRAINIAN NEWS, 25 Jan 02; via 
ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Viktor Andreevych, shockingly, doesn't seem too impressed. He has asked the 
Central Election Commission to bar the new group from participating in the 
election, calling the attempt to capitalize on his name "dirty." (UKRAINIAN 
NEWS, 25 Jan 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
To drive home his point, he quickly dismissed the All-Ukrainian Workers Party 
from his coalition after the party placed a man named Oleksandr Moroz on the 
top of its list of candidates. The man, who has no relation to Socialist Party head 
Oleksandr Moroz, is an electrician from Kyiv. The party will now enter the 
election alone -- unless, of course, Yedyna Rodyna needs a little like-minded 
company. A Yushchenko-Moroz coalition, anyone? (UKRAINIAN NEWS, 24 Jan 
02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
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By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
Aliev visits Moscow 
During Azerbaijan President Heydar Aliev's visit to Moscow last week two 
important announcements were made: The sides are close to resolving 
differences on the status of the Caspian Sea and have reached agreement on 
the status and use of the Gabala radar station. In contrast to President Vladimir 
Putin's visit to Baku last year, which witnessed many declarations of mutual 
cooperation but produced no tangible results, this year's summit seems to move 
Azerbaijan toward closer relations with Moscow. While the US dithered about the 
nature and extent of its cooperation with Azerbaijan, the latter's maneuvering 
room to avoid undue reliance on Russia in the energy and defense spheres 
dwindled. 
 
Agreement on Gabala radar station reached 
On 25 January the Russian and Azerbaijani sides reached agreement on the 
status and terms of use of the Gabala radar site, which have been under 
contention since Azerbaijan achieved its independence. The Gabala facility is 
recognized as Azerbaijan's property but Russia owns the movable equipment it 
contains. Russia will lease the station for 10 years, at $7 million per year, and 
pay the $31 million it owes for the operation of the station from 1997 to 2001. 
Baku will provide air defense cover for the radar installation and Moscow will 
modernize the air defense system and provide new components. (ITAR-TASS, 
1036 GMT, 26 Jan 02; via BBC, and ANS TV, 1700 GMT, 25 Jan 02; via BBC 
Monitoring) These terms are substantially better than those the Kremlin offered 
during President Putin's visit to Baku a year ago when he sought a 25-year lease. 
 
Located 350 kilometers west of Baku, the station came on line in 1985. Besides 
being part of Russia's early warning system against the possibility of ballistic 
missile attack from the southern hemisphere, the station also controls all types of 
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aviation in the area. It was used for reconnaissance during the Iran-Iraq war, the 
Persian Gulf war, and the anti-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan. 
(MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, 28 Jan 02) 
 
 Azerbaijan's leading opposition party, the People's Front of Azerbaijan Party 
(PFAP), issued a statement criticizing the leasing of Gabala radar station to 
Russia. To the party the act represents the institutionalization of a Russian 
military base on the country's territory, which may undermine Azerbaijan's 
security or even serve as a pretext for invasion. "If hostilities between our country 
and Armenia over Nagorno Karabakh resume, no-one can guarantee that Russia 
will not use the Gabala radar station in a way that runs counter to our country's 
interests." (HURRIYYAT, 23 Jan 02; via BBC Monitoring) Moreover, the 
presence of a Russian base in Azerbaijan only can undermine any possibility of a 
NATO country establishing a permanent presence, which has been mooted 
occasionally. 
 
Talks on Caspian Sea status 
On 24 January representatives of the five Caspian states (Russia, Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran) signed a communiqué on preparation of a 
convention on legal status of the Caspian Sea and agreed to hold the next set of 
meetings in April in Ashkhabad. At a 26 January press conference, Heydar Aliev 
indicated that this group, comprising the deputy foreign ministers of the five 
states, is close to achieving a concerted position. (ITAR-TASS, 1144 GMT, 26 
Jan 02; via BBC) 
 
Over the last three years consensus had been established on dividing the 
seabed into national sectors according to the generally accepted principle of the 
median line. This has been the position of all states with the exception of Iran, 
which would like to preserve the 1921 and 1940 treaties with the Soviet Union or 
divide the Caspian into five equal sectors. In the past Azerbaijan had sought 
national divisions of the water surface. The details of the agreement under 
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consideration by the deputy foreign ministers have not been made public. 
However, the process being undertaken now more closely corresponds with 
Russia's and Iran's ambitions rather than those of Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan, 
which over the last few years had sought to define the status of the sea through 
bilateral treaties. The conference process gives Iran greater leverage over the 
proceedings, in that it can exercise a veto to preclude development of the sea's 
resources. 
 
At the same time Russia expects to increase its border guard presence in the 
Caspian. On 23 January, Russia's Federal Border Guard Service announced its 
intention to increase its sea-based forces in the Caspian. The service expects to 
add 10 ships and high-speed boats and reconstruct its bases in Kaspiysk, 
Makhachkala and Astrakhan. ( ITAR-TASS, 1322 GMT, 23 Jan 02; via BBC 
Monitoring) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Michael Donahue 
 
More than a five-year plan needed 
After nearly a century of wasteful management and a parody of agricultural 
planning, the once bountiful topography of Central Asia now resembles the 
surface of the moon, and it will take more than another five-year plan to correct. 
Of course, that is assuming that some of the future regional leaders care enough 
to begin the much-needed project: At present, none seems so inclined. As a 
result, the horrendous health problems resulting from the unnaturally arid climate 
and corresponding mineral deficiencies in diet appear likely to worsen before 
they generate the level of global attention needed to begin the road to recovery. 
One can assume, therefore, that the region's life expectancy, infant mortality 
rates and infectious disease rates will remain among the most pitiful in the world. 
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Despite the frightening truth about Central Asian health issues, rarely does one 
find adequate information available to endangered citizens. State-controlled 
media, stonewalling public officials and medical personnel, and a lack of public 
interest seem to be the primary reasons why few Central Asians know that their 
life expectancy has plummeted, their medical supplies and personnel have been 
gutted, and disease has increased almost across the board since the fall of the 
Soviet Union. Among the most troubling statistics, almost 80% of all 
(reproductive-age) women living in the Ferghana Valley of Uzbekistan suffer from 
anemia, which bodes poorly for improvements in the regions infant-mortality rate. 
(EURASIA INSIGHT, 13 Jan 02; via Eurasianet) 
 
One of the primary reasons for this regional problem is the gradual 
disappearance of the Aral Sea. In the 1960s, poorly designed agricultural plans 
required a series of water diversions from the sea; as a result, it has been 
shrinking steadily and may dry up entirely in the not-so-distant future. (EURASIA 
INSIGHT, 3 Jan 02; via Eurasianet) Moreover, as ominous as the health and 
environmental issues facing Central Asia appear now, the legacy of Soviet 
domination left behind an even greater danger: abandoned chemical and 
biological weapons. 
 
The desiccation of the Aral Sea exposes more and more of the former Soviet 
chemical and biological weapons test site of Vozrozhdenie Island. Despite 
denials that the site was used to produce offensive weapons of mass destruction, 
in 1992 former Russian President Boris Yel'tsin closed the site under Edict No. 
390 -- which officially terminated all offensive biological weapons programs -- 
promising that within two years the island would be decontaminated fully. In 1995 
the US Department of Defense confirmed that the laboratory had been 
dismantled, the infrastructure destroyed and the military settlement abandoned. 
(CENTER FOR PROLIFERATION STUDIES, 1999; via cns.miis.edu) 
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Unfortunately for the residents of Central Asia, the Americans performed only a 
cursory examination. Renewed American interest in the region as a result of the 
"war on terrorism," however, has netted a second chance for the troubled site. 
Recently the US and Uzbekistan reached an agreement whereby US troops will 
clean up Vozrozhdenie Island, where, it is widely assumed, scientists simply 
buried canisters of anthrax and other hazardous materials which still could 
contain live spores. (EURASIA INSIGHT, 3 Jan 02; via Eurasianet) Yet, while 
American decontamination efforts constitute an important first step to improving 
the conditions surrounding the island, they will have little effect on the region's 
overall environment. Broad-based improvements would necessitate new 
irrigation agreements designed to redirect the natural flow of water, which would 
require a concerted effort by all the Central Asian states, an effort none seems 
willing to make at present. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Michael Varuolo 
 
ESTONIA 
Change won't change much 
For the past several weeks, intense maneuvering by the political parties in 
Estonia has attempted to fill the void left after the collapse of the center-right 
coalition government of Mart Laar. While Laar, the country's longest-serving 
prime minister, had achieved success in the pursuit of membership in NATO and 
the EU, his coalition government was thought to have lost touch with many 
Estonians as well as the new president, Arnold Ruutel. (AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, 8 Jan 02; via lexis-nexis) The collapse was caused by the ruling 
coalition's inability to maintain cohesion in the municipal elections of the country's 
capital, Tallinn, and left the newly elected president handicapped by a 
governmental power vacuum while the competing parties vied for supremacy. 
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Ruutel's response was to turn to departing Minister of Finance Siim Kallas. 
Kallas, confirmed as prime minister by the Riigikogu on 22 January, brings a 
sense of urgency and determination to Estonia as he forms the country's 10th 
government since 1991. Within Estonia, Kallas is well-known as an economist 
who organized the currency reform of the early 1990s and oversaw the transition 
from the Estonian ruble to the kroon. Following that endeavor, Kallas achieved 
political success with the liberal Reform Party, which he founded. (DEUTSCHE 
PRESSE-AGENTUR, 22 JAN 02; via lexis-nexis) But Kallas is not without his 
critics. 
 
Despite his credentials as an experienced politician, any further reforms 
sponsored by Kallas will be challenged by the framework of the political system. 
Kallas' Reform Party, in order to assume power, has formed a coalition with the 
former opposition party, the Centre Party. The Reform Party was forced to 
concede one of its mainstay platforms -- opposition to a progressive income tax 
program. As Kallas explained at a party meeting in Otepaa, "If the Reform Party 
has to choose between going into opposition and the risk of introduction of a 
graduated-rate income tax, and forming a large coalition with the Centre Party, 
the large coalition must be chosen." (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, 1251 GMT, 12 
Jan 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0112, via World News Connection) 
 
Indeed, as Kallas moves to form a government, he has shown his need to 
maintain strong ties to the Centre Party. His government (named on 28 January) 
consists of five Reform Party members and eight Centre Party members. 
(AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 0835 EST, 28 Jan 02; via lexis-nexis) By 
populating his government with members of his coalition partner, he has ensured 
that the coalition will maintain a strong voice against the opposition and be able 
to sway influential parliamentary independents towards the coalition's priorities. 
(DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, 22 Jan 02; via lexis-nexis) Although this is a 
new government, with a slightly different political agenda, Kallas has committed 
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the coalition to continuing along the path established by the Laar government by 
seeking to further Estonia's bid for EU and NATO membership. 
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